Insider trading activity contains important information for understanding momentum. In the short term, past winners (losers) continue to earn significant positive (negative) returns only if their insider trading activity indicates positive (negative) insider information. Thus, short-term momentum is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that confirms past return. In the long term, past winners (losers) earn significant negative (positive) returns only if their insider trading activity indicates negative (positive) information. Thus long-term reversal is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that disconfirms past return. After controlling for insider trading information, there is no evidence of overreaction. 
Introduction
document that a strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers generates significant profits in the short term (six to 12 months), which reverse over the long term. After carefully ruling out other potential sources of momentum profits, JT (1993, p.75) conclude that momentum is related to market underreaction to firmspecific information. At the same time, the long-term reversal of the momentum profits is also consistent with delayed overreaction, when investors push the price away from the fundamental value, leading to reversal in the longer term. This momentum effect is considered as the strongest evidence against the efficient market hypothesis, and for this reason momentum has been the center-stage anomaly of recent years (Fama and French, 2008) and attracted substantial research, both empirical and theoretical (JT, 2011 ). Yet, as JT (2011) summarize, financial economists are far from reaching a consensus on what drives momentum. In this paper we study whether insider trading information sheds new light on the two behavioral views of momentum: underreaction and overreaction. Specifically, we examine whether the subsequent returns of past winners and losers are systematically related to preceding insider trading information.
We bring in insider trading information to the context of momentum as an ex-ante proxy for the firm-specific information. It is intuitive to relate insider trading to the firm-specific information, simply because corporate insiders are best positioned to have foreknowledge about the firm-specific information of their own firms and might have traded on such information, to the legally permissible extent. Thus, the preceding insider trading activity in a stock likely reflects what corporate insiders know about the firm-specific information. In this paper we test whether momentum is due to investors underreacting to the preceding insider trading information or due to overreaction. If investors underreact to insider trading information, the subsequent (short-and/or long-term) returns of past winners or losers are expected to be systematically related to insider trading information. If, however, momentum is due to investor overreaction, the short-and long-term returns are expected to be negatively correlated.
For parsimony we classify a firm's preceding insider trading information as either positive or negative. Conventional wisdom suggests that insider net buying (selling) would proxy for positive (negative) insider information. That is, if insiders possess positive information they choose to buy shares; and they sell shares if the information is negative. When the regulatory and litigation risk associated with insider trading is taken into account, however, this view is incomplete. In this paper we consider insiders' decision to keep silent. That is, insiders choose not to trade (neither buy nor sell) when expecting high litigation risk associated with insider trading. This concern for litigation risk is particularly strong for insider sales.
1 Thus, when the insider information is negative and insiders anticipate possible large price drops in the future, they do not trade. This is because shareholders and plaintiff lawyers launch securities classaction lawsuits following large stock price declines on the basis of Rule 10b-5, mostly alleging that corporate insiders had foreknowledge about the information but failed to promptly disclose it to the market. 2 In such cases, insiders' selling activity would be taken as evidence that insiders had the foreknowledge about the adverse information and had traded upon it before disclosing it to the market. 3 In this scenario, ex ante, the best course of action for insiders is not to sell, as lack of insider selling undercuts plaintiffs' allegation that insiders knew the information. 4 Neither would they buy, given the adverse prospects. Thus, the high litigation risk associated with selling on negative information induces rational insiders not to trade at all. The foregoing discussion suggests that insider silence is a proxy for negative firm-specific information and that insider trading, either net buying or net selling, is a proxy for (relatively) positive information.
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Our empirical work starts with forming four portfolios by a two-way sort on past insider trading activity (silence or traded) and past returns (winners or losers). Specifically, among past winners or losers we form "traded" and "silence" groups based on the existence of insider trading activity over the past six months. The "traded" groups consist of stocks (of past winners or losers) that insiders have traded in the past and the "silence" groups consist of stocks that no insider trading activity exists in the past six months. 6 The four portfolios are: traded winners (past winners with positive firm-specific information), silence winners (past winners with 1 See Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000), Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) , Cheng and Lo (2006, p. 821) , Piotroski and Roulstone (2008) , Rogers (2008 Rogers ( , p. 1269 , Lee, Lemmon, Li, and Sequeira (2012) , among others. 2 See O'Brien and Hodges (1991), Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) , Skinner (1994) , among others. For a recent example of securities class-action lawsuits following large stock price declines, see the case involving Yum! Brands: http://securities.stanford.edu/1050/YUM00_01/index.html. 3 See Grundfest and Perino (1997) , Niehaus and Roth (1999) , Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard (2007, p. 642) , Rogers (2008) , Rogers, Van Burskirk, and Zechman (2011, p.2157) , among others. 4 Niehaus and Roth (1999, p. 68) argue that insider selling increases the probability of CEO turnover whose firm is involved in shareholder class action lawsuits. 5 Several recent working papers find that insider silence is related to future negative returns. Ma and Ukhov (2013) find that the negative returns associated with insider silence partially explain a broad set of return anomalies; Gao and Ma (2012) find insider silence predicts extreme negative future returns among heavily shorted stocks. 6 We also examine the difference between cases involving insider net buying and selling. Their differences are, however, economically smaller than those between traded and silence portfolios. See Table 3 Panels C & D.
negative firm-specific information), traded losers (past losers with positive firm-specific information), and silence losers (past losers with negative firm-specific information).
These four portfolios are used to directly test underreaction. 7 If momentum is due to investors underreacting to insider trading information, the short-term returns of the portfolios should be systematically related to insider trading information. Specifically, among past winners, firms with negative insider trading information underperform those with positive insider trading information; among past losers, firms with negative insider trading information underperform those with positive insider trading information. That is, the silence-traded spread is negative for both past winners and past losers. On the other hand, if momentum is due to investors overreacting to past information, stronger short-term momentum should be followed by stronger long-term reversal. That is, the silence-traded spreads should carry opposite signs between the short and long terms. If the silence-traded spread is negative in the short term, the overreaction view predicts that the silence-traded spread is positive in the long term.
Our monthly portfolios are formed over the period from January 1989 to December 2007, based on which we examine future returns up to December 2012. We define the short and long terms as the 1 st and the subsequent four (2 nd to 5 th ) years, respectively, following portfolio formation. 8 Although the sample is relatively short and recent, we confirm the basic empirical regularity of significant short-term momentum profits, which are reversed in the long term. The reversal, however, only exists among past losers.
Our main findings are based on the four portfolios and can be summarized as follows.
First, short-term returns are systematically related to insider trading information. Specifically, among past winners (or losers), the silence portfolio significantly underperforms the traded portfolio in the short term. This finding is consistent with the underreaction view. That is, investors in both past winners and losers have underreacted to insider trading information, which is reflected in future returns.
Second, while the silence portfolios underperform the corresponding traded portfolios in the short term among both past winners and losers, the silence-traded spreads surprisingly 7 In this paper, we simply use the aggregated insider trading activity over a six-month period as a proxy for firmspecific information. We do not explore how insiders make trading decisions conditional on past returns. Neither do we explore how some insiders are better informed than others (e.g., Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012) . 8 In our main analysis the short and long terms are defined as the 1 st year and the subsequent four (2 nd to 5 th ) years, respectively. Our conclusions are robust to whether the short term is defined as six or 12 months and to whether the long term goes to two, three, four, or five years. continue to be negative and significant over the long term. This result rejects the overreaction view. If momentum is due to investors overreacting to past information, stronger short-term momentum should be followed by stronger long-term reversal. That is, the silence-traded spreads should carry opposite signs between the short and long terms. The finding that they carry the same sign rejects the overreaction view. Further, this result suggests that the long term returns are also attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information.
The main results survive a battery of robustness checks. It is robust to alternative methodologies of measuring abnormal returns (cumulative abnormal returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, or average monthly alphas after adjusting for risk factors), and alternative windows to measure past insider trading activity and past return (six or 12 months). It holds whether or not a month is skipped between the periods to measure past and future returns.
Further, the main findings remain strong after accounting for trading volume (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000) , 52-week high (George and Hwang, 2004) , and intermediate horizon returns (Novy-Marx, 2012) . This paper makes a unique contribution by showing the importance of insider trading information in understanding momentum and reversal. Our results suggest a new unified perspective on short-term momentum and long-term reversal: Both momentum and reversal are attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information. Whether the insider trading information is subsequently associated with momentum in the short term or reversal in the long term depends on whether the insider trading information confirms or disconfirms past return.
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Momentum is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that confirms past return; and reversal is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that disconfirms past return. In addition, since the market incorporates confirming information relatively quickly, momentum arises in the short term. By contrast, it takes relatively longer for the market to incorporate disconfirming information into stock prices. As a result, reversal arises in the long term.
The results also show a clear "division of labor" between stocks that contribute to shortterm momentum and stocks that contribute to long-term reversal. It is well documented that the 9 Insider information is viewed as "confirming" past return if it is of the same direction as that of past return. That is, positive (negative) insider information confirms strong (poor) past return. Insider information is viewed as "disconfirming" past return if it is of the opposite direction as that of past return. That is, positive (negative) insider information disconfirms poor (strong) past return.
winner-minus-loser portfolio exhibits strong short-term momentum and long-term reversal. This inter-temporal pattern, however, does not emerge in any of the four sub-portfolios we examine.
Instead, stocks that exhibit strong short-term momentum do not experience long-term reversal while stocks that experience strong long-term reversal do not exhibit strong short-term momentum. In this sense, the well-documented inter-temporal return pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal results from aggregating stocks that either exhibit short-term momentum only or experience long-term reversal only, but not both. Our results provide further evidence that short-term momentum is not necessarily followed by long-term reversal (e.g., JT, 2001; George and Hwang, 2004, 2007; Conrad and Yavuz, 2012) . Such evidence calls for further theoretical development to understand momentum and reversal.
In Section 2 we discuss the related literature and our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and data. In section 4 we first confirm the basic empirical regularity on momentum and reversal for the time period we examine, then present our main empirical results. In Section 5 we discuss the results and describe a new perspective on momentum and reversal. After numerous robustness checks in section 6 we conclude in section 7.
Literature and hypotheses
JT (1993) document that a portfolio strategy that buys stocks with high past returns and sells stocks with low past returns earns significant positive returns over the subsequent six to 12 months. This phenomenon appears pervasive and persistent. It is found in international markets (Rouwenhorst, 1998; Griffin, Ji, and Martin, 2003; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010) , in other asset classes (Bhojraj and Swaminathan, 2006; Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen, 2009, 2013; Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst, 2013) , and in industries (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) . It survives the out-of-sample tests (Carhart, 1997; JT, 2001; Grundy and Martin, 2001; Chabot, Ghysels, and Jagannathan, 2009) . Even more puzzling, the positive significant momentum profits in the first six to 12 months tend to reverse in the long term (e.g., JT, 1993; .
It remains unclear why short-term momentum profits exist and why they reverse in the long term. Rational theories argue that the short-term momentum profits are due to crosssectional variations in expected returns (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Conrad and Kaul, 1998) or due to time-variation in expected returns (Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999; Johnson, 2002; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Sagi and Seasholes, 2007) . As JT (2001; argue, however, rational theories cannot explain long-term reversal, and behavioral models are more promising in explaining both short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Two possible behavioral biases can lead to price momentum: underreaction and overreaction. JT (1993), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) , Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Hong and Stein (1999) , and Vayanos and Woolley (2013) characterize momentum as an underreaction. Conversely, DeLong et al. (1990) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) attribute return continuation to investor overreaction.
In this paper we bring in insider trading as an ex-ante proxy for firm-specific information to shed light on the two behavioral views that are central to understanding momentum and reversal: underreaction and overreaction. Our tests focus on the relation between ex-ante insider trading information and subsequent returns of past winners and past losers. If investors underreact to insider trading information, we expect that the subsequent returns of past winners and losers are systematically related to the ex-ante insider trading information. On the other hand, if momentum is due to investor overreaction, we expect that returns over the short and long terms are negatively correlated.
Sample and data
The sample is based on all NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks (share code 10 or 11) covered in CRSP/Compustat merged database from January 1989 to December 2007, a total of 228 year/month cross-sections. Because we study event returns over the subsequent five years, our sample period for portfolio formation ends in December 2007. The starting point of the sample period is determined by when insider trading data is available.
Because we want our results to be compatible with JT (2001), we choose to apply the same filters as in JT (2001) . Specifically, we exclude stocks whose prior month-end price is lower than $5 and stocks that would be classified into the lowest NYSE market capitalization decile. 10 We also exclude firms with missing or non-positive book value of equity. We obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago and accounting data from Compustat. We follow Fama and French (1992) to construct firm size and B/M ratio, and JT (2001) to estimate past returns and form portfolios. Past return of 10 These two restrictions eliminate low-price and small stocks, which are likely to have low past returns. As a result, the average trailing six-month return of the remaining stocks is 12.7% (see Table 1 ). The average would be 7.6% without these restrictions. Further, since insiders' buying and selling activities are more informative among small firms (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010) , excluding these firms reduces the return predictability following insiders' buying and selling activities (see Table 3 panels C and D). Our main findings are robust when these restrictions are relaxed. See the robustness section for details.
month j is estimated as the buy-and-hold returns over the past six months (from month j-6 to j-1).
We require that stock returns exist in each and every month of the past six months. Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Sias and Whidbee, 2010) . 11 Defined in equation (1), the net insider demand (NID) for month j is the total number of shares insiders buy minus the total number of shares insiders sell over the past six months, normalized by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of month j-1. Our main analyses are based on insider trading activity measured over the past six months, although the results are robust to an alternative window of 12 months.
(1)
We then use past returns and past insider trading information to form portfolios. Stocks with past six-month returns ranked in the top and bottom deciles are grouped in the "winner" and "loser" portfolios, respectively. Stocks with no insider trading activity (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio, and stocks with any past insider trading activity form the "traded"
portfolio. For completeness we also define "buy" and "sell" portfolios, which consist of stocks with positive and non-positive NID, respectively. The intersection between past returns and past insider trading information then forms portfolios such as "silence" winners, "traded" losers, and so on. The portfolio returns start from month j. All variables are defined with greater details in the Appendix. period. The proportion of insider silence is over 40% in the early time and generally declines 11 We follow the literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Sias and Whidbee 2010) to "clean" the insider trading data. Specifically, we use the following filters. We delete duplicate and amended records and records with cleanse code of "S" or "A" are deleted. Transaction price must be available, and we delete records if the number of shares in a transaction is below 100. The transaction code is either "P" or "S" for stock transactions and "M" for options exercised. We delete transactions that involve more than 20% of total shares outstanding, and delete records if the transaction price is outside the 80%-120% range of the CRSP end-of-day stock price.
over time. The sample average proportion of insider silence is 27.3%. Insider net selling is more frequent than net buying.
[Insert Figure 1 about here] NID is more negative for past winners (-0.663%) than past losers (-0.308%), consistent with the literature that the contemporaneous correlation between net insider demand and stock returns is negative (e.g., Sias and Whidbee, 2010) . Both past winner and loser stocks are relatively small and they have lower book-to-market values (JT, 2001) . Conditional on past returns, the "silence" groups have smaller sizes but higher B/M ratios than their corresponding "traded" groups. In addition, the "buy" groups are smaller firms with higher B/M ratios, consistent with the notion that insiders of larger firms tend to sell and insiders are contrarian (Seyhun, 1986; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) . Insiders are more likely to net sell if their firms are growth firms than value firms (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998) . The evidence on firm characteristics also suggests that we control for size and B/M when examining future returns.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Results
We examine future returns of past losers and winners. We follow the literature (e.g., JT, 2001 ) and define the first year as the short term and the subsequent four (2 nd to 5 th ) years as the long term. Our conclusions are robust to whether the short term is defined six or 12 months and to whether the long term is defined up to two, three, four, or five years.
Returns of past winners and losers
For stocks in the extreme and middle deciles of past return, Panel A of JT, 1993; Swaminathan, 2000, p. 2025) .
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As shown in Table 1 , past winners and losers have different characteristics such as size and B/M ratio. We examine returns of these portfolios after adjusting for size and B/M. The procedure is described in the Appendix. Panel B of Table 2 shows the results. For past loser stocks, their short-term abnormal returns are -4.43% (t= -3.83), followed by cumulative longterm abnormal returns of 10.98% (t= 2.97) over the subsequent four years, suggesting that there is short-term momentum and long-term reversal for past loser stocks. For past winners, the firstyear abnormal returns are 3.85% (t= 2.08), consistent with the general pattern that past winners continue to perform well in the short term. There is, however, no reversal in the long term.
Instead, the long-term return is a positive 6.45% (t= 1.61). The winner-minus-loser portfolio exhibits the well-documented pattern of short-term momentum (8.28% with t= 3.29) and longterm reversal (-4.54% with t= -1.21). Figure 2 plots the cumulative returns to the winner-minusloser portfolio over the subsequent five years following portfolio formation, which shows a familiar pattern of strong momentum in the short term followed by reversal in the long term.
[Insert Table 2 Table 5 ). For confirmation purpose only, these results are not reported but available upon request. 13 Following the same approach we further confirm that the winner-minus-loser portfolio return for the 1965-1981 sample period is 11.81% (t= 4.22) in year one, followed by -12.30% (t= -2.39) over the subsequent four years; for the 1982-1998 sample period the short-and long-term returns are 12.23% (t= 5.60) and -1.22% (t= -0.21), respectively; for 1965-1998 sample period the short-and long-term returns are 12.02% (t= 6.77) and -6.76% (t= -1.57), respectively. These results are largely consistent with the prior literature (e.g., JT, 2001).
Portfolios formed on past return and past insider trading information
We now break down stocks of past winners and past losers by their insider trading information over the trailing six months and examine their future returns. Specifically, for past winners or losers, the "silence" portfolio consists of stocks that insiders do not trade over the past six months; the "traded" portfolio consists of stocks that insiders trade over the past six months; the "buy" and "sell" portfolios consist of stocks that insiders net buy and sell over the past six months, respectively. We call these portfolios silence winners, traded winners, and so on. With these portfolios we test the implications of the underreaction and overreaction views. The underreaction view predicts that the silence-traded spread is negative; the overreaction view predicts that the silence-traded spread over the long term has an opposite sign to that of the spread over the short term. Thus, if the silence-traded spread is negative over the short term, it is positive over the long term. Results are presented in Table 3 .
Panel A of Table 3 Over the long term, silence winners earn a significant -8.13% and traded winners earn a significant 11.11%, resulting in a significant silence-traded spread of -19.24% (t=-4.28). This result has two implications. First, it rejects the overreaction view. The overreaction view predicts that the silence-traded spreads carry opposite signs between the short and long terms. Thus, given a negative silence-traded spread over the short term, the overreaction view predicts that the long-term spread should be positive. The result shows that the spread is not positive, but negative and significant, rejecting the overreaction view. Second, the result indicates that the correction of underreaction to insider trading information does not complete in the short term, but continues into the long term. Thus, the long-term return also reflects the market's correction of underreaction to insider trading information.
Panel B of Table 3 is similarly structured as Panel A but focuses on past losers. The first column shows that silence losers earn a significant -9.97% while the traded losers earn a small, marginally significant -1.93% in the short term, resulting in a significant silence-traded spread of -8.04% (t=6.93). This result is consistent with the view that investors of past losers underreact to insider trading information. The second column in Panel B shows the long term returns. Over the long term, silence losers earn a small, marginally significant -3.12% while traded losers earn a significant positive 16.86%, resulting in a significant silence-traded spread of -19.99% (t=-6.00).
This result also rejects the overreaction view, as the overreaction view would predict a positive silence-traded spread over the long term. Further, the significant negative silence-traded spread over the long term suggests that the long-term returns of past losers also reflect investor underreaction to insider trading information.
Since no theory specifies at which time point reversal starts or ends, it is important to check whether our results hold for alternative definitions of the short and long terms. The last four columns of Panels A and B show, year by year, the abnormal returns over the subsequent four years. The silence-traded spreads over each of the four years, for both past winners and losers, are negative and significant, suggesting that underreaction is supported and overreaction is rejected regardless of whether the long term is defined as short as one year (the 2 nd year) or as long as four years (2 nd to 5 th years).
14 [Insert Table 3 about here]
For completeness, Panels C and D of Table 3 show results for the "buy" and "sell" portfolios and the spreads between the two. 15 Both "buy" and "sell" winners earn significant short-and long-term returns, similar to the combined "traded" portfolio. The "buy" and "sell" portfolios of past losers also exhibit similar patterns as the "traded" losers. Furthermore, the buysell spreads are in general statistically less significant and economically smaller than the corresponding silence-traded spreads. For instance, the silence-traded spread for past winners over the long term (2 nd to 5 th years) is -19.24% (t=-4.28) while the corresponding buy-sell spread is only -7.17% (t=-2.01). Overall, the evidence in Panels C and D indicates that more of the information in insider trading activity resides in the silence-traded spread, not the buy-sell spread. 16 As such, for parsimony our subsequent discussions mainly focus on the silence and traded portfolios.
Earnings announcement returns
To further investigate whether investors underreact to the insider trading information and whether they are systematically surprised when the firm-specific information is subsequently disclosed to the market, we extract quarterly earnings announcement dates from Compustat and calculate three-day announcement period abnormal returns adjusted by CRSP equal-weight daily market returns (i.e., an event window [-1, +1] covering one trading day before and one day after the earnings announcement date). Specifically, for any given portfolio, we calculate the threeday abnormal returns of its earnings-announcement firms during each of the subsequent five 12-month periods. If investors underreact to insider trading information, we expect that the silencetraded spread in earnings announcement returns over the short term is negative. If, however, investors overreact in the short term, we expect that the silence-traded spread carries opposite signs between the short and long terms. Table 4 presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional mean earnings announcement period abnormal returns. Panel A shows a significant earnings announcement return of -0.22% for silence winners, while for the traded winners the average announcement return is only 0.04%, which is not statistically significant, resulting in a significant negative silence-traded spread of -0.26% (t=-2.77). Note that the negative return -0.22% for silence winners is economically significant, as compared to the annual cumulative abnormal return of 0.61%. The result suggests that investors of past winners have underreacted to the negative 3.35) for past winners and 0.92% (t=0.93) for past losers, which are more consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010) . See Table 11 for more details. 16 In unreported analysis, we further split the "sell" and "buy" portfolios each into two equal-size portfolios. In general, the spreads between the finer portfolios are relatively small compared to the corresponding silence-traded spreads.
information contained in insider silence by the time of portfolio formation. When negative firmspecific information is subsequently released to the market in earnings announcements, investors are surprised, resulting in significant negative market reactions.
This pattern of underreaction continues over the subsequent four years, as shown in the second column of Table 4 . Panel A shows that the silence winners continue to surprise investors with a significant average abnormal return of -0.21% around earnings announcement. The silence-traded spread over the long term is a significant -0.28% (t=-7.48), suggesting that the pattern of underreaction continues, instead of reverts over the long term. This result is inconsistent with the overreaction view, which predicts that the silence-traded spread is positive over the long term, given a negative spread in the short-term.
Panel B shows a similar pattern among past losers. The silence losers are associated with significant negative earnings announcement returns over the short and long terms; the traded losers are associated with small negative surprises over the short term but significant positive surprises over the long term. The silence-traded spreads are negative and significant in both the short and long terms, a result consistent with investors underreacting to insider trading information. Conditional on insider trading information, there is no evidence of overreaction.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Discussion
The main results provide an alternative perspective on momentum and reversal. That is, both momentum and reversal are attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information. This new perspective deserves some further discussion. In this section we first discuss the nature of insider trading information in the context of momentum. We then describe how preceding insider trading information is related to both short-and long-term returns, why momentum occurs in the short term and reversal arises in the long term, and how the findings on these sub-portfolios can be reconciled with the familiar inter-temporal pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal associated with the winner-minus-loser portfolio.
The nature of insider trading information
Theory that explains momentum naturally interprets strong past return as investors reacting to a positive signal and poor past return as investors reacting to a negative signal.
Studies that characterize momentum as underreaction argue that past winners (losers) continue to earn significant positive (negative) returns because investors underreacted to the positive (negative) signal. To fit insider trading information in the context of momentum and reversal, we thus characterize insider trading information by their relation to past return. That is, insider trading information confirms or disconfirms past return.
Specifically, we characterize insider trading information as confirming past return if the insider trading information points to the same direction as that in past return. That is, insider silence (negative insider information) confirms poor past return (past losers), and the existence of insider trading activity (positive insider information) confirms strong past return (past winners).
On the other hand, insider trading information is viewed as disconfirming past return if the insider trading information is in the opposite direction to that in past return. That is, insider silence (negative insider information) disconfirms strong past return (past winners), and the existence of insider trading activity (positive insider information) disconfirms poor past return (past losers). The chart below illustrates the definition.
Insider activity \ past return Past winners Past losers
Insiders traded Confirming Disconfirming Insiders kept silent Disconfirming Confirming
This characterization of insider trading information helps relate the nature of insider trading information (confirming or disconfirming past return) to subsequent return pattern (momentum or reversal). We discuss this relation next.
How is insider trading information related to momentum and reversal?
With insider trading information characterized as either confirming or disconfirming past return, there is a straightforward relation between insider trading information and subsequent return pattern. That is, momentum is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that confirms past return; and reversal is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that disconfirms past return.
To see this point, we refer back to Table 3 Panel A also shows that a subset of past winners exhibit strong reversal (negative returns)
in the long term. These stocks are those that insiders have kept silent with. That is, insiders have known some significant negative information, which has prevented them from selling shares.
Neither would they buy shares, given the negative information. Insider silence thus disconfirms strong past return, for which these stocks are classified as past winners. The result is consistent with the view that investors have underreacted to the disconfirming insider trading information, which eventually is reflected in future returns. Similarly, Panel B shows that a subset of past losers exhibit strong reversal (positive returns) in the long term. These stocks are those that insiders have traded in the past. That is, insider information is positive. The existence of insider trading activity thus disconfirms poor past return, for which these stocks are classified as past losers. The result is consistent with the view that investors have underreacted to the disconfirming insider trading information, which eventually is reflected in future returns.
Combining what drives return reversal in the long term among past winners and past losers, it is clear that long term reversal arises because investors have underreacted to insider trading information that disconfirms past return.
Why does momentum arise in the short term and reversal in the long term?
It is worth noting the different timing in incorporating confirming and disconfirming
information. It appears that it takes longer for the market to subsequently incorporate disconfirming information into stock prices than confirming information. The confirming information is reflected in the short term: the traded winners earn a significant 5.48% (Panel A of Table 3 ) in year one and the silence losers earn a significant -9.97% (Panel B of Table 3 ) in year one.
The silence winners exhibit strong reversal in the long term (-8.13%), shown in Panel A of Table 3 . There is, however, no significant negative return in the short term, even though investors are experiencing negative earnings shocks (-0.22% for silence winners in Panel A of Table 4 ). The small insignificant abnormal return over the entire first year for the silence winners can be viewed as an outcome of investors incorporating the disconfirming information: the negative shocks from the earnings announcements, and the positive information contained in strong past return, for which the stocks are classified as winners. Similarly, Panel B of Table 3 shows that the traded losers do not experience reversal until the second year following portfolio formation, and that their first year return is even negative (-1.93%).
A "division of labor" between short-term momentum and long-term reversal
A well-documented, puzzling aspect of momentum return is its long-term reversal, which is replicated in our relatively short and recent sample (see Figure 2) . To see whether this pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal shows up in the sub-portfolios, we plot the cumulative abnormal returns for the four portfolios as well as the all-winner and all-loser portfolios. Panel A (B) of Figure 3 shows the results for past winners (losers). Figure 3 shows, surprisingly, that this pattern of short-term momentum followed by longterm reversal emerges from none of the four sub-portfolios formed on both past return and past insider trading information. Instead, the four sub-portfolios exhibit a "division of labor" between two mutually exclusive groups of stocks: one group of stocks generates momentum in the short term and the other group of stocks generates reversal in the long term. In this case, the familiar pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal is a result of aggregation of subportfolios, which exhibit either short-term momentum only (traded winners and silence losers) or long-term reversal only (silence winners and traded losers), but not both.
This point is best illustrated in the relation between the all-loser portfolio and its two subportfolios: silence losers and traded losers. Among past loser stocks, the group of traded losers experiences significant positive returns in the long term (strong reversal) but exhibits no significant negative short-term returns (no momentum), and the group of silence losers exhibits significant negative short-term returns (strong momentum) but experiences no positive long-term returns (no reversal). Thus, there is a clear "division of labor" among past losers: short-term momentum is generated solely by the silence losers, and long-term reversal is generated solely by the traded losers. The all-loser portfolio, which is aggregated from combining silence losers and traded losers, exhibits both significant short-term momentum (-4.43%) and significant longterm reversal (10.98%).
A similar "division of labor" also exists among past winners. The group of traded winners exhibits significant positive short-term returns (strong momentum) but experiences no negative long-term returns (no reversal), and the group of silence winners experiences significant negative long-term returns (strong reversal) but exhibits no significant short-term returns (no momentum). Thus, short-term momentum is generated solely by the traded winners and longterm reversal is generated solely by the silence winners. The all-winner portfolio, which is aggregated from combining silence winners and traded winners, exhibits strong short-term momentum (3.85%). There is, however, no strong long-term reversal. The lack of strong longterm reversal is driven by the traded winners' continued positive returns in the long term (11.11%) outweighing the silence winners' reversing negative returns (-8.13% ).
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Implications for theory
Numerous studies provide explanations for both momentum and reversal. In this section we describe four that explicitly unify the two phenomena and discuss how our main results beg for further development.
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) build their model on two psychological biases:
conservatism and representativeness heuristics. Due to conservatism, investors underreact to news. Thus conservatism contributes to momentum. Due to representativeness heuristics, after observing a long sequence of good news, investors expect that the next period is also good news.
As such, the price becomes too high, which leads to negative returns in the future. Thus, longterm reversal is attributable to representativeness heuristics. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose that overconfidence and self-attribution contribute to short-term momentum and long-term reversal. In their model, the overconfident-informed investor overweights her private signal, causing the price to overreact. The investor's confidence rises when she receives confirming public information. But disconfirming information causes confidence to fall only modestly. Thus public information on average triggers continued overreaction, which causes momentum in stock prices. Such momentum is reversed in the long term as further public signals gradually pulls the price back toward fundamentals. Hong and Stein (1999) All the theories explain the unconditional results of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal. Some elements of each model can also explain certain aspects of our findings conditional on insider trading information. For example, the finding that traded winners and silence losers exhibit return continuation is consistent with investor underreaction. That is, return continuation results from investors underreacting to past information, and the underreaction could be due to conservatism (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), slow flowing of private information (Hong and Stein, 1999) , or gradual fund outflows (Vayanos and Woolley, 2013) .
Conversely, for silence winners, the negative information is reflected in subsequent returns only in the long term, despite of negative shocks in earnings information. This result is consistent with self-attributed investors ignoring the disconfirming earnings information, as modeled in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, p.1842 ).
None of the theories, however, explains the entirety of the results reported in this paper, especially the inter-temporal pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal.
All four theories predict that short-term momentum is followed by long-term reversal. The results reported in this paper suggest that there is a "division of labor". That is, stocks that exhibit strong short-term momentum do not experience significant long-term reversal, and stocks that experience strong long-term reversal do not exhibit significant short-term momentum. This "division of labor" is made possible by separating past winners and losers based on their preceding insider trading information. In this sense, our results suggest that further theoretical work take into account insider trading information.
Robustness checks
In this section we conduct a battery of robustness checks, including alternative methodologies, alternative window to measure past return and/or past insider trading activity, alternative samples and subsamples, and an alternative momentum strategy. In all cases, our main results hold. Details are discussed below.
Alternative methodology
In our main analysis we use cumulative abnormal returns over the 12-month periods.
Since estimating long-term abnormal returns has long been cautioned (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Fama, 1998; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999) , we check whether our results hold for alternative method of measuring abnormal returns. Specifically, we estimate average monthly alphas from the Fama and French (1993) Table 5 .
The two panels of Table 5 are similarly structured as Panels A and B of Table 3 . Since both value-weight and equal-weight results reach the same conclusions, for simplicity our discussion focuses on Panel A (equal-weight) only. The results in general confirm those presented in Table 3 , with minor exceptions discussed below. First, results on the average monthly alphas show significant positive short-term returns for past winners and significant negative short-term returns for past losers. The portfolio of all winners does not experience longterm reversal, while the portfolio of all losers does exhibit long-term reversal. These results show a similar picture as in Table 3 . Second, the silence-traded spreads for both past winners and losers are negative and significant over the short term, supporting underreaction; the significant negative signs of the silence-traded spreads for both past winners and losers over the long term reject the overreaction view. Instead, the result suggests that the long-term returns also reflect investors' underreaction to insider trading information.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We conduct additional robustness checks by using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 12-month periods and find very similar results, which support underreaction but not overreaction. Unreported for brevity, these results are available upon request.
Alternative window to measure insider trading information and/or past returns
In the main analysis we measure past returns and past insider trading information over the past six months and find evidence that supports underreaction and rejects overreaction. In this section we examine whether our main findings hold when we choose a 12-month window to measure insider trading activity and past returns, when we skip a month between the periods to measure past and future returns, and when we use the intermediate horizon past returns (NovyMarx, 2012). As discussed below in greater detail, our main findings are remarkably robust.
Insider trading activity and past returns over a 12-month window
In the main tests we use a window of six months to measure past insider trading activity and past returns. To alleviating concern of data mining, we check robustness by using a window of 12 months to measure both insider trading information and past returns. Accordingly, we reconstruct the portfolios and examine their future returns. The results are presented in Table 6 .
With a longer window to measure insider trading activity, the probability of insider silence is reduced. So are the average numbers of stocks in the "silence" portfolios, which are reduced from 72 and 77 to 42 and 47 for past winners and losers, respectively. The smaller portfolio size could reduce statistical power. Nevertheless, we find as strong evidence of underreaction. That is, the silence-traded spreads over the short term are negative and significant for both past winner and loser groups. At the same time, the silence-traded spreads over the longer term are also negative and significant for both past winner and loser groups, suggesting that the overreaction view is rejected. In addition, none of the four portfolios exhibits the familiar pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal.
Along this line of thought, we also examine the other combinations (insider trading information over the past six months but past returns over the past 12 months; insider trading information over the past 12 months but past returns over the past six months) and find that our main findings are robust. Unreported for brevity, these results are available upon request.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Skipping a month between past and future returns
In the main analysis we do not skip a month between the time periods to measure past and future returns. The momentum literature also adopts a method that skips a month between the portfolio formation and holding periods to deal with the short-term reversal at the monthly level (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990) . For robustness we rerun our test as in Table 3 by redefining past returns over the past six months ending one month before the first month for future returns. Table 7 presents the results, which clearly show that the silence-traded spreads are negative and significant in the short term, consistent with investors underreact to insider trading information. At the same time, the silence-traded spreads continue to be negative and significant over the longer term, rejecting the overreaction view. The overreaction view predicts that the silence-traded spreads switch signs between the short and long terms. Thus, our main findings are robust to including or ignoring return reversal in the very short term (weekly or monthly).
[Insert Table 7 returns following portfolio formation. The results are reported in Table 8 .
Panel A in Table 8 shows that the silence and traded portfolios among past winner stocks exhibit the same pattern as shown in Panel A of Table 3 . That is, the silence-traded spread is negative and significant over both the short and long terms. This similar pattern emerges among past loser stock as well, shown in Panel B of [Insert Table 8 about here]
Subsamples and alternative samples
In this section we examine whether our main findings hold in subsamples formed on cross-sectional characteristics, in subsamples formed on time-series characteristics, and in a less restrictive sample with low-priced and small stocks included. As shown below, our main findings are remarkably robust, which support underreaction but not overreaction.
Subsamples formed on cross-sectional characteristics
An extensive line of research explores the cross-sectional variation of momentum profits.
An incomplete list of the relevant characteristics includes book-to-market ratio (Daniel and
Titman, 1999; Asness, 1997), firm size and number of analysts following (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) , trading volume (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000) , information uncertainty (Zhang 2006) , firm performance (Sagi and Seasholes, 2007) , credit risk (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov, 2007), and heterogeneous beliefs (Verardo, 2009 ), among others. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) study the role of cultural difference in momentum profits. Conrad and Yavuz (2012) form momentum portfolios based on both size and book-to-market.
We choose size, B/M ratio, and number of analysts to examine the robustness of our main findings in cross-sectional subsamples. The choice of these three variables is mainly based on data availability. If there is no analyst forecast reported over the past six months, the firm is assigned zero analysts following. The analyst data is from I/B/E/S. To control the impact of firm size on number of analysts, we regress the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts on the natural logarithm of firm size and keep the residual as the size-adjusted residual analyst following.
Every month we first sort stocks into deciles based on returns over the past six months.
We independently sort stocks into two groups based on one of the three variables (size, B/M, and the residual analyst following). The cut-off point is the NYSE median for size, and crosssectional median for B/M and residual analyst following. This way, for each of the three crosssectional variables, we obtain four portfolios, within which we form silence and traded portfolios. We then examine their short and long-term returns. Results are reported in the three Panels of Table 9 .
For brevity we only present the 1 st year (short term) and subsequent four-year (long-term) cumulative abnormal returns of the portfolios. Panel A of Table 9 , for example, shows that shortterm momentum exists among both small and large firms (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Fama and French, 2008) . Within each of the four past winner and loser groups, the silence-traded spreads are negative and significant in both short and long terms. The significant negative silence-traded spreads over the short term strongly support underreaction, while the similarly significant negative silence-traded spreads over the long term reject the overreaction view. In addition, the familiar pattern of strong short-term momentum followed by strong long-term reversal does not exist in any of the sub-portfolios. This pattern of negative silence-traded spreads over both short and long terms holds also in Panels B (sort on B/M) and C (sort on residual analyst following). Overall, our main findings hold in subsamples formed on these cross-sectional characteristics.
We also examine the role of insider trading information in subsamples formed on trading volume. Swaminathan (2000, p.2049) find that trading volume is a proxy for relative under-or over-valuation. It is then important to check whether our results based on insider trading information remain after accounting for trading volume. Following Lee and Swaminathan (2000), we focus on NYSE/AMEX stocks only. As a result, sample size drops substantially. We independently sort on past return (deciles) and trading volume (two groups).
For past winners and losers, we further construct portfolios based on insider trading information and examine their short-and long-term returns. Results are presented in Panel D of Table 9 . With a smaller sample size weaker statistical power is expected. Nevertheless, our main results remain. Notably, the silence-traded spreads are negative in all subsamples over both short and long terms, and significant in six out of eight cases. This analysis suggests that trading volume does not explain our results based on insider trading information.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Subsamples formed on time-series characteristics
Returns based on momentum strategies also vary in the time series. Due to data availability on insider trading activity, our sample covers a relatively short time period (1989 to 2007) . Thus, the capacity to explore the time-series variability in momentum is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our main results in two chronological sub periods (1989-1997 and 1998-2007) , equal sub periods formed on investor sentiment, and equal sub periods formed on past market return. Following the literature, the investor sentiment index is from Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) . The time-series means of the cross-sectional average abnormal returns of the silence and traded portfolios are presented in Panels A (early and later sub periods), B (low and high level of investor sentiment), and C (low and high past market return) of Table 10 .
Across all three panels, the silence-traded spreads are all negative and significant (at least at the 5% level, most at the 1% level) over both short and long terms. For example, the silencetraded spreads for past winners following high investor sentiment level (Panel B) is -5.79% (t=-2.81) in the short term and -23.07 (t=-3.90) in the long term. Again, the significant negative silence-traded spreads over the short term strongly support underreaction, while the similarly significant negative silence-traded spreads over the long term reject the overreaction view. In addition, the familiar pattern of strong short-term momentum followed by strong long-term reversal does not exist in any of the sub-portfolios.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
A sample that includes small and low-priced stocks
In our main analysis we eliminate low-priced and small stocks by requiring minimum stock price of $5 and market cap above the first NYSE size decile. Since momentum is stronger among smaller firms (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) , it is likely that we are missing an important portion of the firms by excluding the lower-priced and smaller firms. To see whether our findings survive, we reconstruct a sample, in which we only require that the prior month end stock price is at least $1 and we do not impose any requirement on market cap. Based on this less restrictive sample we then repeat the analysis in Table 3 .
The results shown in Table 11 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 , even though the sample in Table 11 is almost double that in Table 3 . For example, past winners experience a significant 3.51% short-term momentum and an insignificant 2.44% over the subsequent four years; past losers experience a significant short-term momentum of -4.89% and a significant long-term reversal of 13.38%. These patterns are similar to those in Table 3 . The main results that test underreaction and overreaction are remarkably similar to those in Table 3 . For example, the silence-traded spreads for past winners are -4.41% (t=-4.83) over the short term and -16.21%
(t=-3.32) over the long term. Once again, the significant negative silence-traded spreads over the short term strongly support underreaction, while the similarly significant negative silence-traded spreads over the long term reject the overreaction view. In addition, the familiar pattern of strong short-term momentum followed by strong long-term reversal does not exist in any of the subportfolios.
Panels C and D show the returns of the buy and sell portfolios, in which insiders net buy and set sell, respectively. Between the buy and sell portfolios over the short term, the buy portfolios outperforms the corresponding sell portfolios, and significantly so among past winners. This result is expected since this less restricted sample includes many smaller firms, among which insiders' buying and selling activities are more informative and better predict future returns (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010) .
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Alternative momentum strategy
George and Hwang (2004) propose an alternative momentum strategy based on nearness to 52-week high. They find that this strategy of buying stocks with prices closest to their 52-week high and selling stocks with prices furthest away from their 52-week high earn significant momentum profits even after controlling for past returns as in JT (1993) and industry returns as in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) . Further, they find that the momentum profits based on 52-week high do not reverse in the long term. In this section we examine whether insider trading information still makes a difference in the extreme portfolios formed on the nearness to 52-week high. To do so, we form new past winners and losers based on stocks' nearness to 52-week high as defined in George and Hwang (2004, p. 2149) , which is the ratio of prior month end price to the highest stock price over the past 12-month period that ends on the last day of the prior month.
Within the winners and losers we further form portfolios based on insider trading information and examine their short-and long-term returns.
Results are presented in Table 12 . Since the nearness variable is between zero and one, we assign all stocks with nearness equal to one to the top decile. For some months the top decile exceeds 10% of the stocks when more than 10% of the stocks have their nearness variable equal to one. Thus, the average portfolio size for the winner group (261) is greater than 10% of the population, while the loser group has an average portfolio size of 255. The first rows of Panels A and B confirm their result that the strategy is profitable in the short term, as past winners earn 2.10% and past losers earn -2.79%, resulting in a short-term momentum of 4.89%. Because our sample period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) is much shorter and more recent than that in theirs , our sample does not perfectly replicate the long-term results in George and Hwang (2004) . In our sample period, there is also long-term reversal of -10.88% (=0.63% -11.51%), which is driven by the past losers.
Among past winners and losers formed on nearness to 52-week high, insider trading information remains important. Specifically, the silence-traded spreads in Table 12 are negative and significant in both past winners and past losers, the same pattern as in our main analysis (see Table 3 ). These results support the notion that short-term momentum is due to investors underreacting to insider trading information. After controlling for insider trading information, there is no evidence of overreaction. Instead, the relation between long-term returns and insider trading information also indicates that investors have underreacted to insider trading information.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that preceding insider trading information is important for understanding momentum.
Past winners (losers) continue to earn significant positive (negative) returns over the short term only when their insider trading activity indicates positive (negative) insider information.
Thus, short-term momentum is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that confirms past return. Over the long term, past winners (losers) earn significant negative (positive) returns only when their insider trading activity indicates negative (positive)
information. Thus long-term reversal is attributable to investors underreacting to insider trading information that disconfirms past return. After controlling for insider trading information, there is no evidence of overreaction.
The results also show a clear "division of labor" between stocks that generate short-term momentum and stocks that generate long-term reversal. It is well documented that the winnerminus-loser portfolio exhibits strong short-term momentum and long-term reversal, a pattern we replicate in our relatively shorter and more recent sample. This inter-temporal return pattern, however, does not emerge in any of the sub-portfolios formed on both past return and past insider trading information. Instead, stocks that generate strong short-term momentum do not experience long-term reversal while stocks that experience strong long-term reversal do not generate strong short-term momentum. In this sense, the well-documented inter-temporal return pattern of short-term momentum followed by long-term reversal results from aggregating stocks that either exhibit short-term momentum only or experience long-term reversal, but not both. Our results provide further evidence that short-term momentum is not necessarily followed by longterm reversal (e.g., JT, 2001; George and Hwang, 2004, 2007; Conrad and Yavuz, 2012) . Such evidence calls for further theoretical development to understand momentum and reversal. This paper makes a unique contribution by identifying preceding insider trading activity as an important source of information that investors underreact to.
Figure 1:
The proportion of firms with insider silence, net buying, and net selling Every month from January 1989 to December 2007, we calculate the cross-sectional proportion of firms with no insider trading (silence), net insider buying (buy), and net insider selling (sell). Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" group; stocks with positive and non-positive NIDs form the "buy" and "sell" groups, respectively. NID is defined in the Appendix. Panels A and B show the cumulative abnormal returns over the subsequent five years for portfolios formed on past insider trading information among past winners (A) and losers (B), respectively. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period form the "traded" portfolio. The dashed lines represent all past winners or losers. Average portfolio size is shown in parentheses within the legend. All (255) Silence (72) Traded ( 
Cumulative abnormal returns for past losers grouped by past insider trading information
All (255) Silence (77) Traded (178) This table presents the time-series averages of cross-sectional equal-weight mean values of past return, NID, size, and B/M. Both size and B/M are taken natural logarithms. Monthly portfolios from January 1989 to December 2007 are formed on past returns and past insider trading information. Past winners (past losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Middle groups include all remaining stocks. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio; stocks with positive and non-positive NIDs form the "buy" and "sell" portfolios, respectively. Column "N" lists the average number of stocks in the portfolio. All variables are defined in the Appendix. , and bottom deciles, respectively. Columns "Yr 1" to "Yr 5" are the cumulative returns over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four years from the 2 nd to the 5 th years following portfolio formation. The row "winner -loser" represents the return spread between the winner and loser deciles. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 lags for the 12-month returns and 47 lags for the fouryear returns. Returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio; stocks with positive and non-positive NIDs form the "buy" and "sell" portfolios, respectively. The average portfolio size is in parentheses. The rows "silence-traded" and "buy-sell" represent the return spreads between the corresponding portfolios. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" are the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. NID, and abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. The row "silence-traded" represents the return spreads between the two portfolios. Every column presents the time-series averages of cross-sectional mean abnormal returns (in %) over the three-day window earnings announcement period. The abnormal returns are adjusted by CRSP equal-weight daily market returns. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" refer to the 1 st to 5 th years, respectively, and "Yr 2 -5" refers to the four-year period from 2 nd to 5 th year. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 lags for 12-month periods and 47 lags for the four-year period. Superscripts a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. The row "silence-traded" represents the return spreads between the two portfolios. Column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the fouryear period from 2 nd to 5 th year; and "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" refer to the 1 st to 5 th years, respectively. Panel A (B) presents the average monthly alphas (in %) for the portfolios by regressing the calendar-time equal-weight (value-weight) monthly excess returns on Fama and French (1993) , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. One month is skipped between past return portfolio formation and future return prediction. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. The average portfolio size is in parentheses. The row "silence-traded" represents the return spreads between the corresponding portfolios. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" are the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. Superscripts a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. The average portfolio size is in parentheses. The row "silence-traded" represents the return spreads between the corresponding portfolios. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" are the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. The tstatistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. Superscripts a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. Column "N" lists the average portfolio size; "Yr 1" presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over the first 12-month period following portfolio formation; and "Yr 2 -5" presents the cumulative abnormal returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. Panels A, B, and C separate the time-series into two by chronological order, investor sentiment, and past market return, respectively. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. Superscripts a , b
, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. The sample includes all common stocks with prior month end price of at least $1. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on past returns and insider trading information. Past winners (losers) are stocks with returns over the past six months ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio; stocks with positive and nonpositive NIDs form the "buy" and "sell" portfolios, respectively. The average portfolio size is in parentheses. The rows "silence-traded" and "buy-sell" represent the return spreads between the corresponding portfolios. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" are the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. Superscripts a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix. Monthly portfolios are formed from January 1989 to December 2007, based on nearness to 52-week high and insider trading information. Nearness to 52-week high is defined as the ratio of the stock price at the end of past month to the highest stock price over the past 12-month period that ends the last day of the past month (see George and Hwang, 2004) . Past winners (losers) are stocks with nearness value ranked in the top (bottom) decile. Stocks with no insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID not defined) form the "silence" portfolio; stocks with insider trading activity over the prior six-month period (NID defined) form the "traded" portfolio. The average portfolio size is in parentheses. The row "silence-traded" represents the return spreads between the corresponding portfolios. Columns "Yr 1" through "Yr 5" are the cumulative abnormal returns (in %, adjusted by size and B/M) over each of the five 12-month periods following portfolio formation; column "Yr 2 -5" refers to the cumulative returns over the four (2 nd to 5 th ) years following portfolio formation. The t-statistics in square brackets are based on Newey-West standard errors with 11 and 47 lags for the annual and four-year returns, respectively. Superscripts a , b , and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns adjusted by size and B/M are defined in the Appendix.
